CHINESE WARLORD Zhang Zongchang 張宗昌 RARE 1926-27 original photo 张宗昌 Shandong

Unsold $500.00 Buy It Now, FREE Shipping, eBay Money Back Guarantee
Seller: collectiblecollectiblecollectible ✉️ (1,138) 0%, Location: Ann Arbor, Michigan, US, Ships to: US & many other countries, Item: 332917485004 CHINESE WARLORD Zhang Zongchang 張宗昌 RARE 1926-27 original photo 张宗昌 Shandong. An extremely rare 6.5" X 8.5" inch photograph of Chinese Warlord  Zhang Zongchang (张宗昌; t 張宗昌; Zhāng Zōngchāng;  Chang Tsung-ch'ang; 13 February 1881 – 3 September 1932), nicknamed the "Dogmeat General" was a Chinese warlord in Shandong in the early 20th century. Time dubbed him China's "basest warlord"  He was assassinated on a platform at Jinan Railway Station in Shandong in 1932. Reads on the back: Genral Chang Tsung-Chang Governor of Shandong here seen with thousands of dollars of military currency piled before him, just after completing a public speech in which he promised more of it would be forced on the populace. 
On September 3, 1932 shots rang out on platform 3 of Jinan Railway Station, Shangdong Province and a tall figure slumped to the ground. The dead man was the notorious Zhang Zongchang, dubbed by Time "China's basest warlord.” He wasn’t just one of the most brutal and ruthless though, he was also one of the most colorful. A man of many monikers, he was known as the Dogmeat General due to a fondness for the gambling game pai gow, called ‘eating dog meat.’ His international cast of concubines - including Koreans, Japanese, Russians, French and Americans - were so numerous he could not remember their names, so they were simply given numbers. Dogmeat liked a concubine... or nine. Image via Sina Zhang’s army was said to number some 50,000, including 4,600 White Russian refugees, complete with pseudo-Tsarist uniforms and regalia. During one of his campaigns, he publicly announced he would win the battle or come home in his coffin. When his troops were forced back he was true to his word, parading through the streets, sitting in his coffin and smoking a large cigar. Victory came more often than defeat though. In April 1925 he conquered Shanghai and then Nanjing, and was subsequently appointed governor of Shandong (he still traveled to Shanghai for carousing and opium smoking sessions). His rule was infamously corrupt though, and it came back to haunt him: his assassin turned out to be the nephew of one of his many victims. 17 Asia: Biographies and Personal Stories, Part I Chinese, who suffered from their misrule, were all too familiar with the warlords. Sun Yat-sen, acclaimed “Father of the Republic,” denounced them as “a single den of badgers.” Usually translated into English as “warlords,” junfa were the bane of Republican China. Some were highly trained officers, others selfmade strategists or graduates of the “school of forestry,” a Chinese euphemism for banditry. In the words of a contemporary, they “did more harm for China in sixteen years than all the foreign gunboats could have done in a hundred years.”1  Warlords struggled for power between the death of would-be Emperor Yuan Shikai in 1916 and the end of the republic in 1949. Holdouts dominated remote frontier provinces until 1950; some of their lieutenants fought a decade later to control drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle. Warlords began their rise to power during the 1911 Revolution that ended millennia of imperial rule. Leaders like dentist-turned-revolutionary Sun Yat-sen argued Western-style Republicanism was the new standard for governance. To succeed, a republic needed support from China’s armed forces and their commander, Yuan Shikai. A rocky marriage between this wily general and Sun ended with the former elected as China’s first president. Yuan never connected to Republicanism and shortly before his death attempted an imperial restoration (1915–16). His demise unleashed the warlords, who quickly carved China into a hodgepodge of nearly independent states. This remarkable collection of alpha males repelled and fascinated contemporary observers. Journalists filled newspapers and magazines with accounts, some highly exaggerated, of warlord actions. Moviegoers gained a different perspective via films like Shanghai Express (1932) or The Bitter Tea of General Yen (1933). Even seasoned diplomats and “old China hands” were mesmerized by warlord avarice and audacity. Still, to most American and Western readers, Chinese warlords were exotic foreigners whose antics were far too complex for comprehension. S. J. Perlman provides a sense of this in his New Yorker satire on the 1936 Xian Mutiny, in which warlord Zheng Xueliang kidnapped Guomindong leader Chiang Kai-shek: “Young” Chang (“Old” Chang’s son, but not “Scalawag” Chang or “Red” Chang) offered to return the Generalissimo to Soong, who didn’t give a hang, but was only negotiating for his sister (who is married to Chiang). Feng, who is called “the Christian Marshal” (as opposed to Feng, the Jewish Marshal, I suppose), had no real business there, but claimed the conductor had given him a wrong transfer. 2  Chinese, who suffered from their misrule, were all too familiar with the warlords. Sun Yat-sen, acclaimed “Father of the Republic,” denounced them as “a single den of badgers.”3  Progressives regarded these militarists as a malignant force whose collective actions factionalized the nation. Junfa, the Chinese word for warlord, soon became a loaded pejorative for misuse of authority. Modern historians share this view; Andrew Nathan accused warlords of creating “the darkest corner in twentieth-century Chinese history.” Fellow China expert Lucian Pye argued they “set back whatever chances there may have been for China to develop a more open, competitive, and democratic system of government.”4 Getting a handle on 1920s Chinese warlords seems daunting. How do you introduce them to students? How could junfa illuminate 1920s A Tale of Two Warlords Republican China During the 1920s By Matthew R. Portwood and John P. Dunn When the wind blows, the grass bends with the wind. —Yuan Shikai Soldiers of Feng Yuxiang practice with their heavy machine guns ca. 1930. Source: US Army Heritage and Educational Center. 18 Education About ASIA Volume 19, Number 3 Winter 2014 Asia: Biographies and Personal Stories, Part I Zhang was the epitome of the wicked warlord. His life was so notorious that it is difficult to separate history from slander. China? Is it possible to provide some spice but avoid overwhelming neophytes with a galaxy of exotic names and their bigger-than-life biographies? All are possible by limiting our focus. Let’s examine just two warlords—possibly the most colorful, and certainly among the most powerful. Very different in their goals, outlooks, and strategies but united by the rules of warlordism, these two men were the embodiment of this breed. Zhang Zongchang was born to a practicing witch, and his father was an alcoholic musician. As an adult, he was a self-described graduate of “the school of forestry” and at six-foot-six was the tallest of the warlords. His troops terrified local civilians—famous for their rapacity and “splitting melons” (bashing skulls with rifle butts). Zhang was the epitome of the wicked warlord. His life was so notorious that it is difficult to separate history from slander. All that was bad in 1920s China was laid at his door; victims and enemies magnified Zhang into a poster boy for evil and avarice. Feng Yuxiang was different. While the bemedaled Zhang proudly sported an opulent marshal’s uniform, Feng was more likely to appear in the quilted gray tunic of a private soldier. Another tall warlord, he was a convert to Methodism, thus nicknamed the “Christian General.” Feng was also noted for his highly disciplined troops that paid for any requisitions and rarely abused civilians. Next, he morphed into the “Red General” after turning to the USSR for military support. The “Lying General” was another pejorative, bestowed by enemies who succumbed to Feng’s crafty tactics. Indeed, Huang Huilan, a well-connected contemporary, described him as the “Tricky Warlord”; it was said he could even double-cross himself. Issues of treachery aside, Feng’s place in Chinese popular culture is very different from Zhang’s. The Christian General is not seen as a warlord but rather a patriot, steadfast in his opposition to imperialism and an early proponent of total war with Japan. He is also remembered for attacks on foot binding, reforestation of the northwest, and an austere personal life that is probably the most stark contrast to the flamboyant Zhang. Yet travel back to Tianjin on December 29, 1925, as Feng’s soldiers yanked Xu Shuzheng out of his train, then shot him in the back of the head. “Little Xu” had been a warlord and was still connected to Feng’s enemies. He had also killed Feng’s relative, Lu Jianzheng, under very similar circumstances in 1918. Always economical, the Christian General’s murder of Xu gained both revenge and eliminated a rival. The willingness to use violence for political gain marked the warlord. Feng had very different agendas from Zhang, but both men spilled copious quantities of blood to gain their objectives. This might be on the battlefield or on a very personal level, like the murder of Little Xu. Thus we’ll use Feng and Zhang to illustrate careers that personify the story of warlordism in Republican China. A few warlords came from prosperous families, but most, like our duo, were from peasant stock. Zhang was a Shandong man, born in 1881; Feng was born nearby in Zhili (Hebei) Province a year later. Both grew to manhood under the Qing dynasty and were saddled with less-than-stellar parents. For Zhang, there was a crusty mother who left her husband for another. Feng’s family stayed together, mother and father united by a common addiction to opium. Young Feng entered the army at eleven, progressing to full-time soldier by eighteen. Zhang had a more varied career that included pickpocket, bouncer, prospector, and bandit. He also worked in Siberia, picking up a command of Russian that would pay significant dividends in the 1920s. During the 1911 Revolution, Zhang led a troop of revolutionary desperados. As both men rose through the ranks, with the help of patrons, they became connected to warlord alliances, often called cliques. Feng joined the Zhili Clique, whose star was Wu Peifu, the “Jade Marshal.” A master tactician, Wu was that rare warlord with a classical education. Zhang followed a more circuitous route to the Fengtian Clique, whose chairman was the unrelated Zhang Zuolin, the so-called “Tiger of Manchuria.” These alignments guaranteed Feng and Zhang would become enemies, for both cliques sought to dominate Beijing, the weak but still valuable capital of China. As historian Arthur Waldron makes clear, the realities of 1920s Chinese warfare were intense, with battles and campaigns that could replicate events from either the Eastern or Western Fronts of World War I. Warlords combined in cliques, because, unless you operated in a faraway border province, survival of lone wolfs was problematic. By the mid-1920s, warlord armies could include more than 500,000 soldiers. They were armed with an array of such diverse weapons that each unit was a collector’s dream, or a quartermaster’s nightmare. Smart warlords kept up on military technology and practiced innovation. Feng, perennially short of cavalry horses, “mounted” some of his troopers on bicycles. Zhang, using linguistic skills attained during his Siberian career, employed White Russian merZhang Zongchang. Source: Asia: Biographies and Personal Stories, Part I cenaries. They might have lost out to the Red Russians by 1921, but these men were veteran soldiers, and as a bonus, they knew how to build and operate armored trains—a formidable fighting platform from the Russian Civil War. With armored trains or old-fashioned rifles and swords, warlord soldiers fought bloody contests from 1916 to 1928. Successful generals learned not only to deploy an infantry brigade or conduct aerial operations, but also how to employ treachery. For instance, generals might use “silver bullets” (bags of silver dollars) to encourage key enemy players to switch sides. Offers of cash, power, or revenge reached high levels in the 1920s, leading Wu Peifu to complain that “betraying one’s leader has become as natural as eating breakfast.” Zhang could play this game, but when it came to treachery, Feng was an authority. Chiang Kai-shek, who suffered as a result, complained that “the so-called Christian General was a master in the art of deception.” Feng’s greatest triumph was the 1924 betrayal of Wu Peifu, an event that completely unhinged the formidable defenses at Lengkouguan Pass. This ended Wu’s career but propelled Feng to the top ranks of the warlords. Ironically, the betrayal also helped Zhang, who conquered this part of the Great Wall, gaining significant credit within the Fengtian Clique. Preventing silver bullet attacks required trusted lieutenants and dedicated soldiers. These were rare commodities among warlord armies, which tended to recruit desperate men incapable of finding employment back home. Most warlord soldiers suffered from weak morale, often exacerbated by poor rations; pay sometimes months in arrears; and mercurial discipline. Feng partially avoided these problems by indoctrination, charisma, and by insisting his officers took good care of the rank and file. He pushed Christianity as glue that could bind soldiers together; his best units boasted 50–60 percent Christians across the board. Feng provided pastors and Chinese missionaries to encourage conversions, and there were cases where entire companies became Christian. Journalistic reports that Feng “baptized entire regiments with a fire hose” were false, but he was known for exhorting his men to sing hymns on a regular basis. If religion didn’t make a soldier more loyal to Feng, nationalism was another argument. By 1925, Feng became hostile to the “unequal treaties” that privileged European, American, and Japanese interests. Via posters, plays, songs, and instruction, his soldiers were told they served the Guominjun, or National Army, and were indoctrinated on the evils of imperialism. This stressed that their service was not simply to a warlord, but rather in support of the nation. Simultaneously, Feng accepted military aid from the USSR, allowing reporters to coin yet another nickname, the “Red General.” Keeping track of Zhang’s nicknames required a score card. He was the “Dog Meat General,” a northern Chinese euphemism that recorded his extreme fascination with a domino-like game called pai jiu. Huang Huilan recalled him arriving at poker games with sacks full of silver dollars. He may have paid his soldiers in worthless script, but gambling debts were sacred and required hard money. Zhang was also the “Three Don’t Knows General,” supposedly because he could never say how many soldiers were under his command, how much money he owned, or the number of his many wives and concubines. Reference to the latter provided even more nicknames, but as journalist John Gunther noted, “for reasons unprintable in a family magazine.”5 The careers of Zhang and Feng meshed in the mid-1920s. The former, with his White Russian mercenaries in front, raced down to capture Shanghai after Wu’s debacle. Feng, now aligned with the Fengtian Clique, continued plotting. On November 5, 1924, his troops expelled Puyi from the Forbidden City, declaring the former emperor a simple citizen of the Republic. This sent Puyi into the arms of militarists like Zhang, who gathered significant wealth in exchange for vague promises of support. In the end, Feng’s actions drove this Manchu royal to Japan, laying groundwork for the puppet state of Manchukuo and Puyi’s infamous role as China’s number one Quisling. Feng next supported a failed coup d’état against Zhang Zuolin, fought for a year, then “retired” to “study abroad.” This was a standard junfa tactic and always considered temporary. The “student” visited an international section of a Chinese “treaty port” or traveled to Europe. It could draw heat away from his army by refocusing enemy attention elsewhere and thus making possible a return in the near future. Feng toured Moscow, cementing Western suspicions that the Christian General was really a Bolshevik at heart. Zhang briefly enjoyed the pleasures of Shanghai, connecting his interests to the criminal gangs and their drug business. Driven out by another junfa, he was made governor of Shandong Province in 1925. Zhang helped Feng accepted military aid from the USSR, allowing reporters to coin yet another nickname, the “Red General.” Feng Yuxiang. Source:. 20 Education About ASIA Volume 19, Number 3 Winter 2014 Asia: Biographies and Personal Stories, Part I Peasants, already angry with warlord misrule, responded by forming the Red Spear militia. Known for their red-tasseled spears and not too many firearms, these were men and women angry enough to take on betterarmed warlord troops. defeat Feng a year later and, sadly for his home province, stayed in charge of Shandong until 1928. During those three very hard years, Zhang and his soldiers destroyed the local economy through graft, mismanagement, and outright destruction. Starved of funds, the entire provincial educational system collapsed by 1927; the provincial currency, issued as fast as printing allowed, was nearly valueless. Criticism could lead to imprisonment, and resistance produced more “split melons,” with severed heads hung from telegraph lines as a reminder to survivors. Peasants, already angry with warlord misrule, responded by forming the Red Spear militia. Known for their red-tasseled spears and not too many firearms, these were men and women angry enough to take on better-armed warlord troops. They made life difficult for Zhang’s smaller units, and woe betide any stragglers caught by the Red Spears. The devastation of Shandong was far removed from Zhang’s headquarters in the capital of Jinan. More like a medieval court, it featured extravagant entertainment; elaborate feasts; “heroic quantities” of French champagne; and, at its center, puffing a trademark Cuban cigar, Zhang. Sometimes benefactor to artists, writers, or entertainers, he also attracted arms dealers, drug kingpins, diplomats, and a stream of Western journalists. Popular cross-cultural writer Lin Yutang, who Zhang’s police chased out of 1926 Beijing, sarcastically described this regime as “the most colorful, legendary, medieval, and unashamed in modern China.”6 Zhang’s “legendary” fiefdom ended via the Northern Expedition (1926–1929), a seminal event in modern Chinese history. Planned by Sun Yat-sen and directed by his most trusted lieutenant, Chiang Kai-shek, this introduced the Guomindang into north Chinese warlord politics. Also known by their English title, “Nationalists,” the best Guomindang soldiers were far better motivated and trained than their warlord counterparts. Although warlord allies were part of this force, the Northern Expedition was supported and led by a cadre of elite men and women, dedicated to Sun’s Republicanism and very willing to fight hard and, if needed, die for their country. Supported by the nascent Chinese Communist Party, the Guomindang in the Northern Expedition aimed to reunite China by capturing Beijing. Both Feng and Zhang played significant roles in this contest. East Asia historian Donald Jordan provided a masterful account of the Northern Expedition. He stressed the confusion this campaign caused for militarists, mainly because it was a revolutionary movement, one that broke many of the established patterns or “rules” of warlordism. The complex internal dynamics of the Guomindang-Communist “united front” are beyond the scope of this article, suffice it to say that Mao Zedong was lucky to be sidetracked from this campaign when Chiang Kai-shek, who turned on the communists, staged his 1927 purge that killed several thousand leftists. The Northern Expedition was a Communist debacle but also an opportunity for Mao, who could now advance his argument that peasants rather than workers were the key for opening the locks of Chinese political power. Feng also benefited from the Northern Expedition. He returned from Moscow; reorganized his armies; and, ever the schemer, became deeply involved with internal Guomindang power struggles that nearly derailed the Northern Expedition. Zhang, steadfast in his loyalty to the Fengtian Clique, briefly reoccupied Shanghai and then conducted a fighting withdrawal to Shandong. His complete mismanagement of that province became evident as Guomindang forces advanced on Jinan. Zhang, guarded by his White Russians, escaped with a small fortune, but throughout Shandong, deserters, stragglers, bandits, and Red Spears spread havoc. Lawlessness on that level served as an excuse for Japanese intervention, creating the Jinan Incident (May 3–11, 1928), where Japan sent troops to occupy the provincial capital and nearly started a full-scale war with the Guomindang. Chiang Kai-shek defused this incident with some loss of face, as he could not afford to fight Japan. Feng, now elevated as an important ally, had cleared warlord troops blocking the roads to Beijing. Together with Yan Xishan, the “Model Governor,” and yet another warlord player, Jiang and Feng ended the Northern Expedition with the conquest of Beijing on June 8, 1928. Although cooperating warlords survived as Guomindang allies, their 1920s heyday was past. This became clear during the 1930 Central Plains War, when Feng and Yan attempted to unseat Chiang with a coalition of the disgruntled. When the smoke cleared, Chiang was victorious. He still employed warlord allies, such as Ma Bufeng, who dominated fellow Muslims in eastern China until the 1949 triumph of Communism, but established a much more powerful center, one poised to create a truly centralized administration but for the Japanese invasion of 1937.7  Warlords might still have influence in post-1930 Republican China, but not like the men who tore the country apart in the 1920s. Zhang makes this very clear with the end of his career. Hounded out of China by the victorious Guomindang, he launched several failed efforts to regain control of Shandong. Claiming he wanted to help the nation during Japan’s invasion of Manchuria, Zhang visited some of his old colleagues in Jinan on September 3, 1932. Preparing to leave for Beijing via the railway station, the “Dog Meat General” was gunned down by the nephew of an officer executed by Zhang. Current scholarship strongly suggests that Feng, “retired” at nearby Tai Shan, helped organize the assassination of Zhang. Captain David Barrett, the American military attaché, noted that Zhang’s last words were “No good!”8  Zhang’s funeral cortege stretched for two miles, including family, former retainers, paid mourners, and the curious. He was buried outside Beijing in Xishan, the “Western Hills”; due to rumors of Zhang’s immense wealth, tomb robbers struck several times in the 1930s. Red Guards entered during the Cultural Revolution but reported finding only a tablet. Feng Communist Party women’s militia holding their red-tasseled spears in Yanan, 1938. Source:  Asia: Biographies and Personal Stories, Part I Guns, and soldiers to wield them, were the currency of power in early Republican China. Warlords consumed government revenues for both and retarded economic growth in doing so. lived much longer and continued his role as supporter of the Republic and gadfly to Chiang Kai-shek. He died under mysterious circumstances while traveling to the USSR in 1948. Five years later, his ashes were interned with full honors near Tai Shan, a mountain retreat he had often enjoyed. Mao Zedong reminds us that “political power grows from the barrel of a gun.”9  He learned this the hard way during the Northern Expedition. It is hard to imagine disagreement from either Zhang or Feng. Guns, and soldiers to wield them, were the currency of power in early Republican China. Warlords consumed government revenues for both and retarded economic growth in doing so. They produced over a thousand conflicts big and small, reducing China’s international standing and encouraging foreign imperialists. Modern Chinese nationalists might prefer to cast Zhang as the wicked warlord but Feng as a patriot. Zhang was the poster boy for warlord excess, while Feng claimed he was a “chameleon,” because he stood with “anyone supporting China, and against anyone whose own interest came first.”10 Both men were key players in the era of the warlords, an era of hyper-militarism that supported the Chinese adage that “good iron is not made into nails, and good men are not made into soldiers.” n Author’s Note: Thanks to Dr. David Buck for providing a hard-to-find journal article, and to Y. C. Chen and Stephen Rynerson for providing online data. Three readers, whose names are correctly unknown via the “blind review process,” also deserve praise for corrections and new sources. If this article deserves merit, it is shared with all; if it retains flaws, those belong to the authors. WANT TO KNOW MORE? (ADDITIONAL RESOURCES) Barrett, Captain David D. “Guest of a Chinese Warlord.” The Coast Artillery Journal, 75, no. 2 (March–April 1932):  Bonavia, David. China’s Warlords. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Boorman, Howard, and Richard Howard. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, Vol.1, Ai-Ch’u. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. Buck, David D. “The Death of a Warlord. The Assassination of Chang-Tsung-ch’ang.” Journal of the China Society 11-12 (1975): 45–50. Dunn, John P. “The Junfa and Their Armies: China, 1916–1937.” China and International Security: History, Strategy, and 21st-Century Policy. Donovan C. Chau and Thomas M. Kane, eds. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2014, 59–78. Jordan, Donald A. The Northern Expedition: China’s National Revolution of 1926–1928. Honolulu: University Press of Hawai‘i, 1976. Lary, Diana. China’s Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. —. Warlord Soldiers: Chinese Common Soldiers 1911–1937. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Lew, Christopher R., and Edwin Pak-Wah Leung eds. Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2013. McCord, Edward A. The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. —. “Warlordism in Early Republican China.” A Military History of China. David A. Graff and Robin Higham, eds. Boulder: Westview Press, 2002, 175–192. Sheridan, James. China in Disintegration: The Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912– 1949. New York: Free Press, 1975. —. Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu-hsiang. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966. —. “Chinese Warlords: Tigers or Pussycats?” Republican China 10, no. 2 (1985), 35–41. Van de Ven, Hans. “The Military in the Republic.” China Quarterly 150 (1997), 352–374. Waldron, Arthur. “The Warlord: Twentieth Century Chinese Understandings of Violence, Militarism, and Imperialism.” The American Historical Review, 96, no. 4 (1991), 1073–1100. —. From War to Nationalism: China’s Turning Point, 1924–1925. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. NOTES 1. No-Young Park, Making a New China (Boston: Stratford Co., 1929), 25. 2. Sidney Joseph Perelman, “Footnote on the Yellow Peril,” The New Yorker, January 30, 1937, 14. 3. Edward A. McCord, The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkley: University of California Press, 1993), 309. 4. Lucian W. Pye, Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1971), 170. 5. John Gunther, Inside Asia (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), 81. 6. Lin Yutang, With Love and Irony (New York: The John Day Company, 1940), 195. 7. Chiang Kai-shek came across as a warlord, and he certainly had numerous allies, like Ma Bufeng, with genuine warlord credentials. The Generalissimo had many failings, but to see him as just a larger version of a 1920s warlord is unreasonable. 8. John N. Hart, The Making of an Army “Old China Hand”: A Memoir of Colonel David D. Barrett (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985), 12. 9. “Mao Zedong on War and Revolution,” Asia for Educators, accessed September 19, 2014,  10. Anatol Kotenev, The Chinese Soldier (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh Ltd., 1937), 120. MATTHEW R. PORTWOOD earned a BA in History at Valdosta State University and is a recent graduate of the China Studies Program at the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. He currently lives, works, and bikes in Seattle, Washington. JOHN P. DUNN teaches World History courses at Valdosta State University. His research interests focus on military affairs in the non-Western world. Soldiers of Zhang Zongchang with their Chinese copies of the Bergmann submachine gun. Source: US Army Heritage and Educational Center. One of the era’s most colorful characters was, without a doubt, the 'Dogmeat General'. Zhang Zongchang, a failed bandit from Shandong who sought refuge with the warlord Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria after his band of mercenaries was defeated in Jiangsu. Zhang loved to lavish money on his family, friends and concubines, and commanded great loyalty by treating his men well. The Dogmeat General got his unique moniker not because of his culinary tastes (sorry to disappoint) but because of his love of gambling, particularly the game paigow which was known colloquially as “eating dog meat”. Zhang was also known as the ‘Three Don’t Knows’, since he could never keep count of how much money, how many soldiers or how many concubines he had. Zhang kept a veritable United Nations of ladies in waiting from Europe, North America and around Asia. Since he couldn’t recall their names nor speak their languages, Zhang simply referred to his concubines by number. Time magazine dubbed him: ‘China’s basest warlord.' Nonetheless, even Time changed its tune by the time Zhang’s back was against the Great Wall, facing KMT forces under the Muslim General Bai Chongxi. The headline had changed from ‘Basest Warlord’ to ‘Potent Hero’, extolling: “Anemic Westerners can only admire Chang’s courage and verve... win or lose, that’s a brave Chinese.” And lose he did. Zhang had a good mind for strategy and was respected as an innovator: He employed close to 5,000 experienced White Russian mercenaries in his ranks, manning armored trains in pseudo-Tsarist regalia. But Zhang would have needed a lot more Russians than that to beat back the forces of reunification. He was assassinated on a platform at Jinan Railway Station in Shandong in 1932. Warlord Rebellion in northeastern Shandong Zhang Zongchang2.jpg Zhang Zongchang, instigator and leader of the rebellion Date 1929 Location Northeastern Shandong, Republic of China Result Government victory; warlord forces dispersed or destroyed Belligerents  Republic of China Self-defense groups: Red Spear Society White Spear Society Warlord alliance Supported by:  Japan (suspected)[1] Commanders and leaders  Liu Zhennian Zhang Zongchang  Chu Yupu (POW)  Huang Feng-chi  Sun Dianying  Konstantin Petrovich Nechaev (possibly) Units involved  National Revolutionary Army (NRA) Ex-Shandong and Zhili Army soldiers, defectors and bandits[2]  White Russian mercenaries (rumoured)[3] Strength 7,000 (initially, later more)[4] Huang: 27,000[3] Sun: 7,000[5] Casualties and losses 1,500+ killed[2] Thousands killed, the rest deserted[1] Thousands civilians killed[2] The Warlord Rebellion in northeastern Shandong was an uprising of several allied Chinese warlord armies under the leadership of Zhang Zongchang in 1929. The rebels wanted to regain their former territories in Shandong from Liu Zhennian, the man who had defected from Zhang to the Nationalist government in Nanjing after the Northern Expedition. After some initial successes, the rebels were defeated due to the indiscipline of their forces. In the end, the uprising failed to topple Liu Zhennian's rule over eastern Shandong, but resulted in high civilian casualties and widespread destruction at the hands of both sides in the conflict. Contents 1 Background 2 Rebellion 3 Aftermath 4 References 5 Bibliography Background Soldiers under Zhang Zongchang's command in 1924. Though his men respected and feared Zhang,[6] their quality as soldiers suffered from lack of training and weaponry, as well as indiscipline.[7][8] After the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916, China disintegrated as various military commanders seized power throughout the country. Organized into cliques, they controlled the Beiyang government and constantly fought against each other for supremacy in what came to be known as the Warlord Era.[9] One of the most notorious warlords from this period was Zhang Zongchang, who was the de facto ruler of Shandong at the time and known for his brutality. Although he was hated and feared by the civilian population due to his authoritarian methods, the so-called "Dogmeat General" commanded a relatively loyal army and managed to keep Shandong under his control for much of the late 1920s; in this he was aided by subordinates such as Chu Yupu and Liu Zhennian. Zhang's rule came to an end, however, when Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government defeated him during the Northern Expedition in 1928. Like many other warlords, Zhang was not willing to accept his reduced status and exile in Dalian. In order to regain his former power base, he began to plot an uprising with his long-time follower Chu Yupu and another warlord, Huang Feng-chi.[10] Zhang also allegedly tried to enlist the help of the White Russian commanders Grigory Semyonov and General Konstantin Petrovich Nechaev. Historian Philip S. Jowett considered it possible that at least Nechaev actually supported Zhang.[3] In his plans to recapture Shandong, Zhang Zongchang had a number of important assets: firstly, tens of thousands of his former soldiers still remained in Shandong. Most of them had not been able to join the National Revolutionary Army (NRA) after Zhang's defeat, and remained unemployed.[3] In a precarious economic situation and mostly still loyal to their old commander, they joined his forces for a second time.[11] These Shandong and Zhili Army ex-soldiers were not necessarily reliable nor combat-effective, however. In the face of the Nationalist forces during the Northern Expedition, Zhang's followers had "melted away without putting up much of a fight",[8] and were even more lacking in training and weaponry now that they had been demobilized.[11] While Zhang's forces were not in the best shape, they had the advantage of not having to face regular NRA troops in eastern Shandong, as the area was under the control of Zhang's former associate Liu Zhennian. Liu had defected to the Nationalists during the Northern Expedition, and was awarded to rule eastern Shandong like an "unreformed warlord" without intervention since October 1928.[11][12] Although de jure part of the NRA, Liu's forces were typical of the average warlord, and suffered from little training in comparison to regular armies.[2] Liu was not particularly loyal to the Nationalist government in Nanjing,[4] and he had no support from the local population which he had terrorized, having driven them into rebellion in some areas. The counties of Laiyang and Zhaoyuan were held by Red Spear Society peasant insurgents by early 1929.[12] Lastly, Zhang possibly had covert support from the Empire of Japan, which increased his confidence in recapturing Shandong.[1][13] Rebellion Warlord Rebellion in northeastern Shandong is located in ShandongLongkou and HuangxianLongkou and HuangxianDengzhouDengzhouZhifuZhifuMupingMuping Map of Shandong showing important locations of the rebellion. Fushan is directly west of Zhifu. In spring 1929, the rebellion started with a "well-organized insurrection" at Longkou and Huangxian. Liu's local garrison quickly defected to the rebels.[14] Soon after, Zhang, Chu and Huang landed with a small retinue and began to gather their former troops. After a short time, Huang had gathered an army of 26,000 men and the warlords began to move on Zhifu, the most important city of northeastern Shandong. Their opponent, Liu, had much fewer NRA soldiers at his disposal and would receive only "half-hearted" support from the central government during the rebellion: 200,000 rounds of ammunition and 50,000 yuans as war chest.[3] After some skirmishes, Zhang arrived at Zhifu with a large force, for whose defense Liu had only been able to muster 7,000 men. The two sides clashed on 14 February, and the rebels were defeated despite their superior numbers, probably because they were badly armed and trained in comparison to the NRA soldiers. Furthermore, Zhang Zongchang, who might have rallied his men, was nowhere to be found during the engagement. The warlord army lost 500 men (200 dead, 300 captured) and, more importantly, 2,000–3,000 rifles as well as 15 machine guns. Zhang and his allies remained undaunted by this first setback, and retreated to Dengzhou where they set up their base.[11] What followed were weeks of "desultory fighting" during which government as well as rebel troops terrorized the local population.[1] Warlord soldiers razed six towns and 50 villages, partially in retaliation for the murder of a rebel officer and an assassination attempt on Zhang, but also out of frustration about the disappointing course of the rebellion as well as simple greed and vandalism. Captured women and girls were sold as slaves on Huangxian's market for 10–20 Mexican dollars[15][14] (the Mexican silver dollar was the main currency used in China at the time).[16][17] On the other side, Liu ignored any orders from Chiang Kai-shek, while his men posed as "protectors" at the same time as they robbed and abused the local peasants. Many citizens of Zhifu had so little confidence in the government forces' capabilities to end the rebellion that they fled to Dalian.[15] This chaos allowed the Red Spear Society which already occupied parts of the hinterland to expand its influence, as many locals turned to the peasant rebels to protect them.[14] Other villages in Shandong formed their own self-defense groups, but these did not necessarily cooperated. In Tung-nan County, at least three irregular armed groups were active at the time of the warlord incursion, namely the small "Southern Army", the 2,000-men strong force of Wang Tzu-ch'eng, and a White Spear Society branch. Although the latter had been explicitly mobilized to protect locals from Zhang Zongchang's forces, it instead had to defend itself from attacks by the other two bands. After defeating them, the White Spears became rather popular and powerful in Shandong's hinterland.[18] Nevertheless, none of the secret socities could openly challenge the rampaging soldiers, as the peasant militias were too poorly armed.[14] After capturing Zhifu, Zhang's soldiers hoisted the old republican flag over the city. According to historian Philip S. Jowett, this flag was often used as "symbol of the good old days of warlord China".[5] In early March, the warlord alliance and Liu agreed to a five-day ceasefire during which the rebels attempted to bribe Liu to defect back to them. They offered him 100,000 yuan, but Liu "thought his loyalty was worth at least 500,000 yuan". Zhang and his allies did not meet this price, however, and Liu remained on the government side.[5] As no agreement was forthcoming, both Zhang and Liu gathered more troops,[1] and with the truce over, the rebels again marched on Zhifu. They besieged the city, and were soon reinforced by opportunistic bandits and another warlord, Sun Dianying, who brought 7,000 fresh soldiers with him. Eventually, the city's defenders were betrayed by their own comrades: One of Liu's regiments under Colonel Liang defected to the rebels, allowing them to capture the city on 1 April. Initially, the warlord forces behaved relatively disciplined, but on 6 April "they ran amok" in Zhifu, starting a six-day long crime spree of killing, looting and raping. Eventually, the officers managed to regain control over their men and put a stop to the "worst outrages", though at this point the city was largely destroyed. Meanwhile, Zhang used his victory and conquest of more territory to impose heavy taxes on the local population.[5] Liu and some of his forces had managed to retreat from Zhifu to Muping, where the warlord army again put them under siege. This time, however, the indiscipline and lust for plunder of his troops crippled Zhang's attempt to finally destroy Liu. Losing interest in fighting and preferring to loot the undefended countryside, so many warlord soldiers deserted their posts that Zhang was eventually forced to lift the siege. While Zhang was still surrounded by number of loyal troops, his situation quickly deteriorated and Liu soon retook Zhifu in a counter-offensive. By mid-April, any remaining unity among the warlords' army had collapsed; the rebels fled into the countryside, where they became little more than a number of "disorganised rabbles". The leaders of the insurgency simply attempted to escape the wrath of the government troops and civilian population.[5] While Zhang was able to return to Dalian on 23 April,[13] Chu Yupu and his remaining 4,500 loyal troops fled to the town of Fushan, whose 20,000 inhabitants they took hostage. The following 13-day siege by Nationalist forces was marked by atrocities at the hands of Chu's soldiers. Besides mass rapes and robberies, the defenders also tied women and children to posts on the town walls in order to use them as human shields. Soldiers from both sides who were wounded in front of the city were left to die, as neither side allowed Red Cross workers to bring them to safety. According to some accounts, Liu and Chu eventually allowed women and children to leave the city on the insistence of Christian missionaries. Jowett considered these accounts "doubtful", however, since "such compassion would be out of character" for either commander. When Fushan finally fell, many women and girls committed mass suicide by jumping into the town's wells because they did not want to bear the perceived "shame" of being a rape victim. Besides the civilian casualties of the siege, around 1,500 NRA soldiers and 2,000 rebels died in combat at Fushan;[19] many surviving warlord soldiers were killed out of revenge after the town's capture.[20] Chu Yupu, however, was spared by the Nationalists and allowed to go into exile in Korea; Jowett assumes that he bribed his opponents for safe passage.[19] Aftermath Further information: Han–Liu War and Red Spears' uprising in Shandong (1928–1929) With the warlord rebellion defeated, peace only returned temporarily to northeastern Shandong. Soon after the conflict, Liu Zhennian and another Nationalist general/warlord, Jen Ying-chi, fought a brutal two-day war over who had the greater authority in Shandong, which Liu won.[21] Meanwhile, the Red Spears' uprising further escalated; by August 1929, the peasant rebels had taken control over much of northern Shandong's hinterland as well as Dengzhou. Having ignored the issue until then, Liu finally moved against the Red Spears in September and brutally crushed the insurgency in two months.[22] Liu remained in power until he was ousted by Han Fuju in course of a bitter war in 1932. Unlike any of the previous warlord rulers of eastern Shandong, Han actually proved to be relatively capable and popular as civilian administrator.[23] Chu Yufu, on the other side, returned to Shandong soon after his exile to Korea, and was murdered.[21] Accounts differ on how he died: According to some accounts, Liu Zhennian had him killed;[24] others report that he was captured by vengeful peasants. These either buried him alive, or buried him up to his chin so that "black ants and the searing sun gave him Zhang Zongchang This is a Chinese name; the family name is Zhang. Zhang Zongchang Traditional Chinese 張宗昌 Transcriptions Zhang Zongchang (simplified Chinese: 张宗昌; traditional Chinese: 張宗昌; pinyin: Zhāng Zōngchāng; Wade–Giles: Chang Tsung-ch'ang; 13 February 1881 – 3 September 1932), nicknamed the "Dogmeat General" (Chinese: 狗肉将军; pinyin: Gǒuròu Jiāngjūn)[1] and "72-Cannon Chang",[2] was a Chinese warlord in Shandong in the early 20th century. Time dubbed him China's "basest warlord".[3] Contents 1 Life 2 References 3 Bibliography 4 Further reading Life Born in poverty in Yi County (now Laizhou) in Shandong, Zhang joined a bandit gang in 1911 and rose in power after offering his band's services to the army of Jiangsu's military governor. His success as a part-time bandit chief and militiaman was short-lived, and after being defeated by rivals he sought refuge with the warlord Zhang Zuolin in Manchuria. He made a good impression, with one story being that he rose in popularity one year at Zhang Zuolin's birthday party: in contrast to other guests who showered the warlord with expensive gifts, Zhang Zongchang sent him two empty coolie baskets and failed to turn up himself. Zhang Zuolin was baffled until the purpose of the gift was ascertained: Zhang Zongchang's empty basket implied he was a man willing to shoulder whatever heavy responsibilities the warlord entrusted him with. He was subsequently rewarded with a command position in his army, though only after proving himself in battle did Zhang Zongchang visit his superior in person. Zhang Zongchang's nickname of the Dogmeat General came from a fondness for gambling, especially for the game Pai Gow which northeastern Chinese called "eating dog meat". He kept some 30 to 50 concubines of different nationalities, including Koreans, Japanese, White Russians, French and Americans, who were given numbers since he could not remember their names nor speak their language. He was free with his gifts, lavishly squandering money and concubines on superiors and friends. As a result, his commanders were very loyal to him, contributing to his military success. According to the wife of Wellington Koo: '[Zhang] was known everywhere as the "Three Don't Knows" (Chinese: 三不知; pinyin: sān bù zhī). He said he didn't know how much money he had, how many concubines, or how many men in his army.' Zhang Zongchang proved to be one of the more capable warlord generals, making effective use of armoured trains manned by experienced White Russian mercenaries. He recruited up to 4,600 White Russian refugees from the Russian civil war, from which he formed a cavalry regiment, complete with pseudo-Tsarist uniforms and regalia. He was also one of the first Chinese generals to incorporate women into the military on a large scale, including using a regiment of nurses consisting entirely of White Russian women. They trained their Chinese counterparts, resulting in greater efficiency in taking care of Zhang's wounded troops, a significant boost for morale and combat capability. While having a reputation as one of the most brutal and ruthless warlords, he was also one of the most colourful. After defeating the army of general Wu Peifu by making his enemy's forces defect, he rewarded the defectors by allowing them to keep their original ranks. He then promoted his own officers, but since there was not enough metal to make the gold and silver stars for their rank insignia, he ordered the stars to be made from the gold and silver paper foil in cigarette packages. During the mass promotion ceremony, the officers were surprised to find their insignia already torn even before the ceremony had ended. During one of his campaigns, he publicly announced he would win the battle or come home in his coffin. When his troops were forced back he was true to his word—he was paraded through the streets, sitting in his coffin and smoking a large cigar. It was also a matter of public amusement that he kept his aged mother with him at all times, except when on campaign, when he left her at his opulent palace. In 1924 he took part in the Second Zhili–Fengtian War and helped partition Shanghai between the opposing forces. In April 1925 he conquered Shanghai proper and then seized Nanjing, both for the glory of Zhang Zuolin's Fengtian clique. He was subsequently appointed military governor of Shandong, which he ruled as warlord until May 1928. Zhang traveled to Shanghai for frequent carousing sessions with Zhang Zuolin's son, Gen. Zhang Xueliang. Both men enjoyed opium, for which Shanghai was a key site in the smuggling trade, and the Fengtian economy became increasingly reliant on the drug. In an infamous incident in 1925, an argument in Zhang's headquarters over who among a group of officers should receive the biggest payment from an opium deal led to a shootout which saw three of them kill each other. In 1928, during the Northern Expedition, Gen. Bai Chongxi led Kuomintang forces that defeated and destroyed Zhang Zongchang's army, capturing 20,000 of his 50,000 troops and almost capturing Zhang himself, who escaped beyond the Great Wall to Manchuria.[4] He fled to Japanese protection in Dalian, though remained unwilling to accept his reduced status. From Dalian, he plotted to regain his former territories. Possibly enjoying covert support by Japan, Zhang, his long-time follower Chu Yupu and another warlord, Huang Feng-chi, returned to Shandong in 1929 and launched a major rebellion against Liu Zhennian, the Nationalist-aligned de facto ruler of eastern Shandong at the time. Gathering tens of thousands of demobilized soldiers who were still loyal to them, the three warlords fought for several months against Liu's followers, thereby causing great destruction and many casualties among the civilian population. In the end, the rebellion was defeated, though Zhang managed to escape back to Dalian.[5] Later that year, he was living quietly in Beppu, Japan, with his mother, though he was thrown into the spotlight again when he "accidentally" shot Prince Xiankai (憲開), a cousin of the deposed emperor Puyi. According to Zhang the gun he was holding while standing at his hotel window happened to go off and shoot the young prince in the back, killing him instantly, though it was more likely he killed the playboy prince for dallying with one of Zhang's many concubines. He was charged, found guilty by a Japanese court and given the choice between 15 days' imprisonment or a $150 (US) fine. He chose the fine.[6] While visiting Shandong in 1932, he was assassinated by the nephew of one of his many victims, who was in turn given clemency and pardoned by the Kuomintang government. Contemporary claims were made that the "filial murder" might have been part of a plan set up by a local governor to remove Zhang as a political rival.
  • Country/Region of Manufacture: United States
  • Size Type/Largest Dimension: Medium (Up to 10")
  • Listed By: Dealer or Reseller
  • Date of Creation: 1926-1927
  • Color: Black & White
  • Subject: Zhang Zongchang (张宗昌)
  • Original/Reprint: Original Print

PicClick Insights - CHINESE WARLORD Zhang Zongchang 張宗昌 RARE 1926-27 original photo 张宗昌 Shandong PicClick Exclusive

  •  Popularity - 0 watchers, 0.0 new watchers per day, 30 days for sale on eBay. 0 sold, 1 available.
  •  Best Price -
  •  Seller - 1,138+ items sold. 0% negative feedback. Good seller with good positive feedback and good amount of ratings.

People Also Loved PicClick Exclusive